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Abstract: Banks are in the business of taking risks. The 3 pillars of Basel II capital 
accord highlight the crucial role of informative risk disclosures in enhancing market 
discipline.  The specific role and responsibilities of the board of directors or supervisory 
boards in banking institutions continue, however, to fuel debate. Findings of the 
literature are often inconclusive. The main contribution of this study is examining how 
board characteristics affect risk in banking industry. We explore this relationship by 
using many econometric approaches. The empirical analysis based on a sample of 11 
Tunisian conventional banks over the period 2001-2011 reports the following results 
when using GLS RE: small and dual functions boards are associated with more 
insolvency risk but have no significant effect on credit and global risks. The presence of 
independent directors within the board generates an increase in global risk but has no 
significant effect on insolvency and credit risks. A lower CEO ownership has no 
significant effect with all measures of risks. Finally, banking capitalization is associated 
with more insolvency risk, and small size banks assume lower credit risk. These 
findings are performed by using a GMM in system approach. 
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Introduction  
The international financial crisis which hit world economy in 2007 and has intensified 
since mid-September 2008 has been marketed as the most serious crisis that has ever 
occurred after the 1929 Great Depression (Trabelsi, 2011). Although the crisis initiated 
with the American subprime market bubble, it has progressively spread to most 
international financial markets through derived products. The global nature of the crisis 
is its most distinctive feature in that most countries were affected. Subprime credits are 
purely an American practice (they exist under more or less moderated forms in other 
countries like the UK) and it is the American institutions which are known for loans. 
This crisis has nevertheless quickly expanded due to an interdependence characterizing 
financial institutions, securitization which allowed investors access to foreign real estate 
markets and to re-evaluation of risk price.  Decrease in risky assets prices in the US 
affected European banks which possessed such assets, thus reducing their demand and 
speeding European stock markets collapse.   
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The emergence of this crisis and the recession that followed, as well as the dispersion of 
public trust in organizations management has raised several questions on bank 
governance and the role of banks in this event (Manière, 2012). In this context, Hasan et 
al. (2009) concluded that the start of these crises which were followed by an economic 
downturn relates to bank governance quality system. Indeed, several researchers, 
including Beck et al. (2000), Wurgler (2000) and Caprio et al. (2007) concluded that 
banking system stability leads to the proper functioning of the financial system, which 
in turn promotes economic growth. Therefore, it is imperative to implement reforms and 
corrective actions that will allow the financial system to become more efficient and 
stable. This is the reason that led regulators to conduct a discussion on both the methods 
of crisis resolution and the imposition of new prudential standards, and therefore setting 
healthier and stronger bank governance (Borisova et al., 2012; Manière, 2012). 
Different governance mechanisms may consist of main banking risk factors. Dannon 
(2009) states that the internal mechanisms of governance and ownership structure 
contribute to improving bank governance and are therefore more effective in explaining 
bank risk. Risk mitigation and performance improvement remain a major competitive 
opportunity and a competitive advantage. Since the publication of Berle and Means’s 
(1932) book "The modern corporation and private property", conflicts between 
shareholders and managers have been a subject of numerous studies which aimed at 
integrating within company’s operation diagram, the nature of the objectives pursued by 
the leaders and whether they differ from those of shareholders (Williamson, 1963). 
To explain interest differences between managers and shareholders, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest three reasons. The first source of conflict stems from the fact 
that investors’ perception of risks is different to that of executives. The second source is 
rooted in horizon differences between shareholders and managers. Finally, the third is 
represented by the collection of policy benefits in kind by managers at the expense of 
shareholder interests. According to Jensen and Meckling, these conflicts generate what 
these authors call agency costs. However, market imperfections and the presence of 
some criteria, such as the theory of transaction costs and information asymmetry; 
require an intervention of bank governance to address these problems. Therefore, 
governance system of banks is based on some pillars: regulation, external mechanisms 
and internal mechanisms. In addition, the financial literature has always considered 
ownership structure as a primary mechanism to resolve governance interest conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and can enhance firm value. Based on these 
headlines, previous studies dealing with the relationship between board characteristics 
and risk-taking led to conflicting results in the United States of America and Europe. 
Few scientific papers deal with the relationship between banking governance and risk 
taking. The aim of our study is to examine the nature of the relationship between 
governance internal mechanisms and management of banking risks in the Tunisian 
context. The main contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it allows to test the 
contribution of governance from the perspective of internal mechanisms in explaining 
bank risk, and also to study the impact of board characteristics on risks of Tunisian 
commercial banks. The paper is structured as follows: The second section presents a 
review of the literature relevant to the relationship between board characteristics and 
risk-taking. The third section describes the data, variables selected, econometric 
approaches and the main empirical results. The fourth section concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review, Theory and Hypotheses Development 
The separation between ownership and control has meant that the law gave wide powers 
to the board of directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) show the importance of the board in 
the control structure, mainly in large companies. Indeed, for them, the board should be 
an incentive and a disciplinary mechanism for managers to resolve agency conflicts and 
maximize firm value. 
Referring to the Principle 1 of Basel recommendations on bank governance (2006), 
“Board members should be qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding of 
their role in corporate governance and be able to exercise sound judgment about the 
affairs of the bank”. The identification of the board of directors’ relevance to risk taking 
is determined by its size, its management and its structure (Jezzini, 2005 & Bliss et al. 
2007). The work of Adams and Mehran (2003) on U.S. banks shows the existence of a 
positive relationship between performance and banks with multi-member boards of 
directors. 
Chia-Ling (2011) shows that the CEO/chairperson duality is associated with lower 
corporate performance. The CEO and chairperson is the same person, a fact which leads 
to insufficient monitoring of the board, resulting in a reduced performance. He also 
shows that more independent directors in the board are required when the CEO/ 
chairperson duality exists.  Based on this analysis, three hypotheses are developed to 
examine risk management in relation to governance mechanisms. 
2.1. Impact of Board Size on Bank Risk-taking 
Studies on the relationship between the board of director’s size and banking risks 
generated conflicting results. Rachdi and Ghazouani (2011) found a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between a small board and insolvency risk in 
Tunisia, which is consistent with the work of Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Pathan 
(2009). According to these authors, and in line with the recommendations of the code of 
good corporate governance in Tunisia, a small number of directors within the board 
accelerates decision making and facilitates control contrary to large boards that make 
the communication process more cumbersome and difficult, and may face coordination 
problems due to their supervision efforts (Lipton and Lorsh, 1992). Moreover, Trabelsi 
(2010) shows that a large number of members within the Board has a very negative 
effect on performance of Tunisian banks. In this context, Jensen (1993) argues that 
effective control of sales is lost when the size of board of directors is large. 
Other studies (Brokovich et al., 2004, Ben Khediri, 2006, and Dannon, 2009) question 
the effectiveness of board of directors in reducing risk when it is small, and on a basis of 
arguments show the presence of a positive relationship between small size and banking 
risk. They believe that a large board of directors could help better assess the risk of 
investment projects thanks to a diversified structure and to a better expertise. Then, the 
larger the number of directors, the lower banking risks. Salloum and Azoury (2008), 
who point out, confirm this result that an increase in size of the board in the case of 
financially insolvent firms seems necessary and is as an effective mechanism. Similarly, 
Blanchard and Dionne (2003) suggested that the use of sophisticated instruments to 
hedge risk increase with an increase of the number of directors constituting the board. 
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For these authors, the boards have a wider control power and adequate information 
sources and they tend to undertake risk-hedging activities. 
 
Thus, the formal representation of the first hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
Hypothesis1. (H1): board size has an effect on Bank risk-taking 
 
2.2. Impact of CEO Duality on Bank Risk-taking 
The relationship between the chairman function and the role of leadership was raised by 
agency theory. Jensen (1993) shows negative effects of the chairman/chairwoman on 
risky investments when he or she holds the position of a CEO. Trabelsi (2010) confirms 
this association in Tunisian banks. For the control function to be effective, it is 
recommended that the general manager does not occupy the position of chairman.  
In Tunisia and according to the note issued on 2012 by the governor of the Central Bank 
on good governance rules, it is recommended that the principle of separation between 
decision and control functions in the reforms be introduced in 2012 in order to establish 
a sound and prudent management ensuring sustainability of banks. In the same context, 
Mamoghli and Dhouibi (2009) have shown empirically that the risk of insolvency of 
Tunisian banks increases if the manager also occupies the function of the chairman. 
Dannon (2009) found out that the dual functions of director and chairman of the board 
led to risky credit and investment decisions because in the case of a dual leadership, the 
manager may have higher authority on the board and the entire banking firm, which 
may result in a reduction of the effectiveness of controls. Likewise, empirical studies 
found a negative effect of this combination of functions on the risk of firms’ bankruptcy 
(Daily and Dalton, 1993).  
Based on these arguments, the second hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
Hypothesis2. (H2): Duality of the general manager has an effect on Bank risk-taking 
 
2.3. Impact of Independent Directors on Bank Risk-taking 
Several studies examined the effect of the presence of external directors on bank. 
Agency theory suggests that outside directors play an important role in monitoring 
managers' performance. Jensen (1993) and Pathan (2009) found that a significant 
percentage of external directors serving on the board contribute to a strong reduction of 
various banking risks (total risk, risk of asset returns, idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk 
and insolvency risk). Similarly, Lefort and Urzua (2008), Dahya et al. (2008) and Lin et 
al. (2010) agree that the presence of outsiders on the board maximize shareholder 
wealth and ensure sustainability of the firm because of their skills on the one hand and 
their experience serving the benefits of the company. In this context, Ben Khediri (2006) 
believes that boards with a significant proportion of external directors, risk coverage 
probability is high. Blanchard and Dionne (2003) argued that "the more important the 
number of external directors is the more important hedging activities”. In response to 
this argument, a second line of thought suggests that external directors are not able to 
determine function control of managers, and their presence on the board is not desirable 
because they have no effect on the decision to hedge risk and are unable to effectively 
monitor management of executives (Dionne and Triki, 2005). This can be explained by 
the fact that they are unable to understand the specificities of the bank (opacity, 
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complexity...)4 and they cannot take advantage of their knowledge which may be useful 
to reduce risk in contrast to internal directors who are more informed about the different 
activities and specificities of their business (Linck et al., 2008).  
Based on these arguments, the third hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
Hypothesis3. (H3): independent directors has an effect on Bank risk-taking 
 
3. Empirical Framework  
3.1. Sampling Procedure and Composition 
The sample examined in this paper consists of the 11 largest domestic commercial 
banks in Tunisia over the period 2001-2011, totaling 121 observations. The data are 
sourced of Tunis Stock Exchange. Annual reports of the selected banks and completed 
form are of the Bankscope database. Following Adams and Mehran (2008), the 
governance data are measured on the date of the proxy statement, i.e., at the beginning 
of the respective fiscal year. 
3.2. Empirical Model and Measures of Variables 
The increased interest in banks’ board governance following the recent international 
financial crisis motivates us to investigate whether and to what extent their board 
structure affects risks. Our aim is to examine the following relationship, and we will 
refer to the study of Pathan (2009) conducted in American banks. This regression 
equation is constructed to test empirically the three main hypotheses, H1, H2 and H3, 
given the theoretical and empirical discussion in Section 2. 
ititit
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Where subscripts i denotes individual banks (i = 1,2, . . . ,11), t time period  
(t = 2001, 2002,…,2011), Ln is the natural logarithmic, β are the parameters to be 
estimated and ε is the error term. Risk: Several different measures of bank risk-taking 
have been used in empirical studies. In this study, we measure bank risk taking using 
the Z-score, the credit risk and the global risk of each bank. Z-score equals the return on 
assets (ROA) plus the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset 
returns. Because the z-score is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the z-
score, which is normally distributed. The credit risk equals customers credits divided on 
customers’ deposits. The global risk equals the standard deviation of the return on assets. 
Board size (BS): is the total number of directors serving on the bank board at the end of 
each fiscal year. Duality of the general manager (DUAL): is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the CEO also chairs the board, but is otherwise zero. Independent directors 
(IND): is the number of independent directors, as a percentage of the total number of 
board directors.CEO ownership (CEOWN): The percentage of the banks CEO’s 
                                                          
4Fore more detail, see Becht et al. (2011). Why bank governance is different. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 27, 437–463. 
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shareholdings. Bank size (BANKS): Total assets as at the end of each fiscal year. 
Capital (CAP): Total equities as at the end of each fiscal year.  
3.3. Econometric Analysis 
Like Pathan (2009), we estimate the equation using a within estimator (Fixed effect) and  
a generalized least square random effect (GLS RE), following the Baltagi and Wu 
(1999) technique. Table 1 presents regressions of the impact of bank board determinants 
on risk when either Z-score, credit risk and global risk are the dependent variable. 
The Hausman test confirms the appropriateness of the random-based effects estimation 
procedure used in this study (P-value of Hausman statistics is larger than 5%).Also, the 
fixed estimator is inconsistent in our study because this procedure aggravates the 
problem of multicolinearity due the existence of dummy variable (Duality of the general 
manager). Using the GLS RE, the regression is well-fitted with an overall R squared of 
40.8% for Z-score, 29.6% for credit risk and 25.8% for global risk with statistically 
significant Wald Chi-square χ2 statistics for all risk measures. 
The coefficient on BS is negative across all risk measures (-0.563 for Z-score, -0.751 
for credit risk and -0.003 for global risk) and only statistically significant at the level of 
1%for Z-score. This result illustrates that banks with small board are associated with 
more insolvency risk (Andres andVallelado2008; Pathan (2009; Rachdi and Ghazouani 
2011). For the variable BANKS, the coefficient is negative across all measures of risk (-
0.412 for Z-score, -6.446 for credit risk and -0.002 for global risk), and only statistically 
significant at the level of 1% for credit risk. This implies that small size banks 
institutions assume lower credit risk. Bouaiss (2008) find a significant negative 
relationship between risk and the size of the bank. 
This table presents the results of GLS RE estimator. Z-score, credit risk and global risk 
are the dependant variables. Board size (BS), duality of the general manager (DUAL), 
independent directors (IND), CEO ownership (CEOWN), Bank size (BANKS) and 
Capital (CAP) are the independent variables. The reported t-statistics with GLS RE 
estimates are robust to random fixed-effect and to heteroskedasticity. Hausman χ2 
statistics: The test evaluates the significance of an estimator versus an alternative 
estimator. Wald χ2 statistics: The test is a way of testing the significance of particular 
independent variables in a statistical model. The numbers in parentheses represent the 
absolute values of t-statistics. 
Turning our attention to the variable CEOWN, we find out that coefficients are positive 
(1.368 for Z-score, 6.011 for credit risk, and 0.013 for global risk) and not significant 
across all risk measures. Our findings about the not statistically significant positive 
coefficient on CEOWN across risk point to clear evidence that indicates that as the 
percentage of CEOs shareholdings increases, their risk preference decreases. This result 
is not consistent with findings of Pathan (2009) for US banks. Consistent with 
expectation, coefficients associated to IND are positive (1.232 for Z-score, 9.746 for 
credit risk and 0.131 for global risk) and only statistically significant for the former at 
10% level for global risk because independent boards are more sensitive to regulatory 
compliance. Lefort and Urzua (2008) and Lin et al. (2010) find that the presence of 
outside directors enhance returns of shareholders and reduce the risk taking.  In contrast, 
Pathan (2009) finds a negative and statistically significant result for total risk in US 
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banks.  The coefficients on DUAL (1.164 for Z-score, 2.795 for credit risk and 0.008 for 
global risk) and CAP (8.511 for Z-score, 6.483 for credit risk and 0.026 for global risk) 
are still positive and statistically significant across the Z-score.  
Table 1: Regression Results of the Bank Board Structure and Alternative 
Measures of Risk 
Variables 
Z-SCORE
 
GLS RE 
Credit risk
 
GLS RE 
Global risk
 
GLS RE 
BS 
-0.563*** 
(2.69) 
-0.751 
(0.98) 
-0.003 
(0.93) 
DUAL 
1.164** 
(2.27) 
2.795 
(1.45) 
0.008 
(1.13) 
IND 
1.232 
(0.38) 
9.746 
(0.88) 
0.131 
(1.65)* 
CEOWN 
1.368 
(0.79) 
6.011 
(0.92) 
0.013 
(0.47) 
BANKS 
-0.412 
(0.83) 
-6.446*** 
(3.74) 
-0.002 
(0.28) 
CAP 
8.511*** 
(5.94) 
6.483 
(1.16) 
0.026 
(1.23) 
Constant
 
-14.531 
(1.24) 
12.162*** 
(3.29) 
0.172 
(0.84) 
Number of Observation
 
113 121 117 
Wald χ2 Statistics 78.42 34.64 35.42 
P-value of Wald  χ2 0.000 0.000
 
0.000 
Within R2 0.435 0.273 0.226 
Between R2 0.355 0.094 0.300 
Overall R2 0.408 0.296 0.258 
Rho 0.260 0.565 0.479 
Hausman χ2 statistics 3.30 12.79 2.88 
P-value Hausman 0.771 0.246 0.823 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
3.4. Robustness Test: Dynamic Panel GMM in System Estimation 
For robustness tests, we estimate the same regression using Generalized Method of 
Moments in system (GMM in system).  In table 2, according to Wintoki et al. (2012), 
the GMM in system estimator has been used to explore findings of GLS RE. We will 
use one lag of the instrumental variable to limit the potential problem with more weak 
instruments. 
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Table 2: Regression Results of the Bank Board Structure and Alternative 
Measures of Risk 
GMM in system 
Variables 
Z-SCORE
 
GMM 
Credit risk
 
GMM 
Global risk
 
GMM 
BS 
-0.242 
(0.74) 
-0.221 
(0.23) 
-0.002 
(0.77) 
DUAL 
0.042 
(0.16) 
0.115 
(0.44) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
IND 
-5.579 
(1.07) 
3.813 
(0.39) 
0.097 
(0.22) 
CEOWN 
0.200 
(1.33) 
-8.393 
(0.10) 
-0.018 
(0.90) 
BANKS 
0.216 
(1.15) 
-2.145*** 
(4.32) 
-0.004 
(0.38) 
CAP 
9.186*** 
(4.67) 
0.952 
(0.32) 
0.003 
(0.15) 
Constant
 
31.490 
(0.94) 
-50.438*** 
(2.66) 
0.109 
(0.44) 
Number of Observation
 
100
 
110
 
103
 
Wald χ2 Statistics 3465.39 1.07e+06 13.23 
P-value of Wald χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan Test 3.550 3.276 5.021 
P-valueSargan 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR (1) -0.979 -1.078 -1.628 
P-value AR (1) 0.327 0.280 0.103 
AR (2) -0.952 -0.990 0.664 
P-value AR (2) 0.341 0.321 0.506 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
This table presents the results of a GMM in system estimator. Z-score, credit risk and 
global risk are the dependant variables. Board size (BS), duality of the general manager 
(DUAL), independent directors (IND), CEO ownership (CEOWN), Bank size 
(BANKS) and Capital (CAP) are the independent variables. The reported t-statistics 
with GLS RE estimates are robust to random fixed-effect and also to heteroskedasticity. 
AR (1): Arellano and Bond test of null of zero first-order serial correlation, distributed 
N (0, 1) under null. AR (2): Arellano and Bond test of null of zero second-order serial 
correlation, distributed N (0, 1) under null. Sargan test: Is a statistical test used to check 
for over-identifying restrictions in a statistical model.Wald χ2 statistics: The test is a 
Volume 13, Issue 4, 2013 
 
 
203
way of testing the significance of particular independent variables in a statistical model. 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t-statistics. 
The Wald-test indicates fine goodness of fit, the Sargan and serial-correlation tests do 
not reject the null hypothesis of correct specification (P-value of Sargan test and P-value 
of AR (2) test of Arellano and Bond are larger than 5%), lending support to our 
estimation results.  
For the Z-score, the reported coefficients estimates are similar to the results issued from 
GLS RE except for IND and BANKS. Contrary to our expectation, the coefficient on 
IND is negative (-5.579) and not statistically significant. This result is similar to 
findings of Pathan (2009) who found a negative and not statistically significant 
coefficient between independent directors and insolvency risk. The coefficient of 
BANKS is positive (0.216) and not statistically significant. This implies that small size 
banks assume lower insolvency risk. 
For credit risk, the reported coefficients estimates are similar to the results issued from 
GLS RE except for CEOWN and for the global risk the reported coefficients estimates 
are similar to the results issued from GLS RE except for CEOWN.  Our findings about 
the statistically non-significant negative coefficient on CEOWN across credit risk point 
to a clear evidence, which indicates that as the percentage of CEOs shareholdings 
decreases, credit risk preference increases. 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper tried to assess whether bank board structure (board size, composition, CEO 
ownership and CEO duality) is associated with risks. Using a sample of 11 Tunisian 
conventional banks over the 2001-2011 period, this paper finds evidence which 
indicates that a small bank board and duality board are associated with more insolvency 
risk but have no significant effect with credit and global risks. The presence of 
independent directors within the board of directors generates an increase of global risk 
but has no significant effect on insolvency and credit risks. A lower CEO ownership has 
no significant effect in the three measures of risks. Bank capitalization is associated 
with more insolvency risk and small size banks assume lower credit risk. 
The results of this study imply that bank board characteristics are a crucial factor of 
bank risk-taking. Those findings have potential policy implications for regulators of 
Tunisian banks: to maintain a performing banking stream, Tunisia should strengthen 
rules and practices of mechanisms of banking governance because poor governance in 
financial institutions generates significant costs for all the economy, and good practices 
are appropriate for promoting well-functioning banks. Since 2011, the Central Bank of 
Tunisia has been working to enhance the role of the board of directors in banking 
governance and to empower the monitoring of Tunisian banks.The board should 
determine global risk tolerance level and translate it into different risk categories and 
develop a strategy that respects the interests of all stakeholders. Also, Tunisia must 
adopt the Financial Stability Board (FSB) recommendations and establish audit, 
nominating, and compensation committees composed entirely of independent directors 
to strength internal and external risks.  
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